So perhaps "the problem" that you highlighted could be summarized as "the unintended consequences of unforgetable feeds". I always try to look at these problems from the sociotechnical perspective: without technology, how would human communities function? Could we replicate that in technology as accurately as we can? I view computer technology as just another language. Protocols are languages that computers speak on behalf of humans, so the issue is about designing languages for conversations that create communities. Before I digress into philosophy, let's go back:

Is the following sentence true? "Every sentence that someone says in real life will eventually be recorded and shared to the whole world". I don't think so, so neither should its Scuttlebutt counterpart be true: "Every unencrypted message on ssb is public forever and to everyone". Most friends forget what other friends said, except some specific messages. We should support the same.

Let's move on the next quote, is the following sentence true? "We should optimize for humans to spread information between each other, on a stranger-to-stranger basis, as efficiently as possible" I don't think so, so neither should its Scuttlebutt counterpart be true:

If I were to break compatibility and redesign ssb completely from scatch, I'd use a peer sampling service on a fully random overlay network, and then use a quality metric (primarily) based on feed subscription overlap to prioritize replication connections (and also do some clever scheme of gossiping network addresses based on the quality metric). That is pretty much throwing all the trust overboard, instead optimizing for replication quality. Actual ssb is much more moderate, and that's probably a good thing.

Trust means that some kinds of messages are spread more quickly in clusters of high trust concentration, and leak outwards slowly or with less efficiently. This is a feature, not a bug. To attack a cluster of high trust, you need capabilities that can match it. By not being able to be part of the cluster, a stranger cannot "catch" up with their information flow that well. The trust bubble protects those inside it. This mirrors the real world case where an outsider can have a rough idea of what's going on in a group, but if they try to attack the group by making accusing claims, they'll just be guessing. The attacker doesn't have the whole context to understand the group.

Trust-driven connections optimize the information flows to have higher bandwidth in clusters, but to have slow but positive bandwidth for outsiders. I think this accurately reflects the real world too. Imagine an isolated village somewhere in India, there might be lots of interaction and stories going on there. Something eventful may happen, and that's when the outside world gets interested in the event, and comes to inquiry what happened. They get some information. They understand some of it. And they report what they understood, which may be wildly inaccurate, because it's not as bandwidth-privileged as an insider is. This is also why spies exist, to provide a high bandwidth outside channel into a cluster, and it's interesting that spies are playing a trust game first and foremost.

Some social issues will never disappear with technology, because technology and social are orthogonal, you shouldn't solve one with the other and vice-versa. We can only hope to build technology that is not trying to subvert or alter the social, because when it does, then technology plays an active role in shaping culture, and ends up creating new social problems (e.g. Twitter harassment) although it has solved some social problems (e.g. Twitter reach and ease of engaging with any community). I think the technology layer should aim to harmonize with the inner workings of social info bandwidth, so that our answer to social problems are social solutions.

(Note 1: Statements in bold were used just to make it easier to skim and speed-read, not for shouting. Note 2: for every declarative sentence I wrote you can implicitly add "in my humble opinion" in front. )