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UNIX geek interested in security and crypto.

@zozs %MUysF+KYLvAPhV9N/QIaq+YOUtPSv+34PM/DmjdFj2g=.sha256
Voted # Earthstar v10 - a butt-first announcement ![An illustration of three peo
@zozs %IvgnAdvCm0KzgtBLXEeVvCgiVRoOUzWkMAVshDEqh2Y=.sha256
Re: %K63bnaK8L

@Powersource (phone) my previous research group did a lot of post-quantum research. They had an internal nerdy bet about which algorithm NIST would select 😄

And yeah, crystals-kyber is public/private key encryption, but meant to be used similar to how RSA is used for encryption today, i.e. just to protect a symmetric key for something like AES or ChaCha20, not for bulk encryption of the data itself :).

@zozs %H/ULRmlWTzDckNBHkYmaMIM5WIl5KRqs+Bi2z2yFzvo=.sha256
Voted ## Grant approved – Private groups in Manyverse :tada: :scream: I'm hyped
@zozs %CrOZcbs7jiRnuWWf0EVTslE2ggav+LfiT4DBpRLtv0o=.sha256
Voted undefined
@zozs %XrvhakS/hqjN0OGvb8DpnELIit1jbSgK558Fd9BUb9I=.sha256
Re: %VvPN2Qu0D

@Daan MVD i agree it does hollow out the idea of signed binaries a bit. On the other hand, if the alternative is that the signing keys are distributed to several hosts, I think a multi-stage pipeline could be the lesser evil of the two options.

@zozs %nOA78wPzTVcS48AxU3VdyOJOjAr3ijg3mc1GJfN4Z7E=.sha256
Voted [@zozs](@S1h5yat/vRFUJw7ft5+U661/AblIZsdDCA6ZGOb7814=.ed25519) yeah reprodu
@zozs %IJGtdaRTjOM9Azw8IvS4DimqLN/ZZh7a0ytQuspzqyY=.sha256
Re: %VvPN2Qu0D

Also another thought, if reproducible builds are possible for that particular project, having multiple people build the same source and then publish the resulting binaries/hashes would be a nice way to not actually having to trust the builders. If multiple independent builders produce the same binary I would feel confident that the build is ok :).

Still really tricky to actually make reproducible builds for most projects though :/

@zozs %7BL13QicwUcubrvpFSIwF66D497d/elwuFdZDqOcTHc=.sha256
Re: %VvPN2Qu0D

I sketched a bit on this like a year ago, especially trust-related things with git-ssb since its access control model is interesting (anyone can push). I think there are two ways there, either 1) to base trust on the ssb identity, such that "run pipeline if the git-ssb message is from a set of trusted ssb identities" or 2) use regular git commit/tag signing with PGP, and only run pipelines for commits with valid signatures.

I think 2) is easier, and also more generic since you can then either git-ssb, gitea, gitlab, or any other way to host git. It is also easier to share PGP keys between devices.

I played around a bit with it with Concourse since it's quite neat and extensible, but got stuck when I wanted to run git-ssb inside a Docker container inside my CI/CD VM, needed for concourse to pull the source. Haven't looked at it since.

@Powersource (phone) I agree your multi-stage pipeline is a nice way to solve that. Also fairly easy to do in something like Concourse where you can trigger a build pipeline for any kind of changed resource (new git commit, new docker image, new version of file on S3-compatible storage, etc.). So you could probably trigger a pipeline as soon as one of your trusted peers has an updated artifact, and then sign it.

@zozs %DOTfhUTBp1qGG6wTHl+M7VyXtdkcts/PexmtH4uGBcU=.sha256
Voted # Tremola v0.1 Introducing a new SSB client for private chats only, runnin
@zozs %lnTcPH5RotxXXJytBVvvRkdeX6/pPX37/NE7x+UwoS0=.sha256
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